Key takeaways:
- The use of phased negotiations approaches have been fruitless as the length of time they take to unfold invites the process to be compromised by external factors and disruptions
- Poorly conceived or implemented negotiations can actually cause the Peace Process to go backwards
The salient achievement of the Madrid Conference (1991-93) was its symbolism as opposed to any tangible progress. As both the Israelis and Palestinians had a chance at Madrid to outline their respective prerequisites for a future peace, the conference provided an important (and up until that point lacking) starting point around which both sides could envisage a future path to peace unfolding from. This symbolism generated the momentum that led to the Oslo Process’ Declaration of Principles, which involved Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) recognising each other as legitimate representatives. Recognising the PLO as legitimate representatives of Palestine by extension meant Israeli recognition of Palestine as a legitimate community.
However, Oslo was the point at which momentum in the Peace Process stalled, momentum which is still yet to be regained. The shortcoming of the Declaration of Principles was that it laid out highly aspirational goals – ‘final status’ negotiations resulting in a peace treaty – but didn’t provide sufficient detail on how to get there. As such, the process faltered in the mid-1990s which led to both sides hardening their respective stances as they sought to protect their bargaining positions.
The next major installment in the Peace Process – the 2000 Camp David Summit – failed again due to the problematic nature of the goals. The infeasible goals were compounded by the increasing distrust between both parties. On the Israeli side, this was due to the increasing influence of Hamas and Arafat’s lack of control. On the Palestinian side, this was due to the increasing polarisation in Israeli politics on the Palestinian issue, caused largely by the growing prevalence of radical religious parties. The failed outcome of Camp David actually caused a regression in the Peace Process, and an increase in polarisation between both parties.
The most recent major iteration in the Peace Process – the Arab League’s ‘Road Map for Peace’ – mirrored the logic of the Oslo Accords, that of phased negotiations. Again, the procrastination on key issues this long-term approach invited enabled the process to become side-tracked when both sides regressed into blaming each other for violating terms of the agreement.
References
MacQueen, B. (2013). An Introduction to Middle East Politics. London: Sage. pp.318-323.
